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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS WAYNE McCLOUD
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14,817

MAXINE LOWE BAUM,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage
brought by the appellant, Thomas McCloud, when the motorcycle he
was riding collided the automobile driven by the respondent,
Maxine Baum, on-March 28, 1974.

It is claimed that respondent

was negligent in the manner in which she operated her vehicle.
The respondent denies any negligence on her part.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court submitted the issues of liability and damages
to the jury.

The jury found that defendant was not negligent.

The

appellant's motions for a directed verdict and new trial were denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
set aside and the case remanded with an order to enter a directed
verdict on the issue of liability, and a new trial on the issue of
damages alone.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this are quite simple and there is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On March 28, 1974, at approximately 4 :oo

dispute concerning them.

p.m., the appellant riding his motorcycle, was returning from

lR.

281)

WOrk.

He had just turned east on Center Street in Provo , Utah ,

from the old Geneva Road,

(R. 281) and proceeded in an easterly

direction on Center Street at a speed of approximately 30 m.p.h.
(R. 281, 221, 250)
2131

The posted speed limit was 35 m.p.h.

lR.

Center street in this area runs in an east-west direction,

with one lane of traffic in each direction.
level and straight.

(R. 21

and the roads were dry.

(Ex . # 1)

The road is

On this day, the weather was clear

(R. 2801.

Even though i t was daylight,

appellant had his headlight on, as was his custom, in order to be
more visible to oncoming traffic.

(R 2 81)

After making his turn

east on Center Street, appellant found himself behind a large
truck carrying a camper.
some 30 feet.

He followed this truck at a distance of

(R. 281, 2661

As the truck/camper approached the

intersection of 16000 West and Center Street, the driver activated his left turn indicater and moved into the intersection to make
a left turn onto 16000 West (R 281, 342)

There is some dispute

as to whether the truck/camper actually stopped within the intersection or merely slowed down at the intersection and made his
turn without stopping.
remember.

Neither the appellant nor the respondent

(R. 271, 297, 305, 342)

The only independent witness

was stopped to the north of the intersection waiting to make a
left hand turn.

He stated that the truck never blocked his vision

of the motorcycle, but i t did block his vision of the respondent's
automobile, indicating that the truck had at least partially corn·
pleted its turn prior to the collision.

(R.

272)

The respondent was approaching the intersection of 16000 west
and Center from the east.

As she neared the intersection, she
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activated her left turn signal and came to a stop.

(R. 356)

She

observed the truck/camper approaching with his left turn signal
activated.

She was able to see no cars behind the truck/camper

and so proceeded to make her left turn.

(R. 342)

In the middle

of her turn, she noticed the appellant about to enter the intersection from the west, but by that time it was too late to avoid the
imminent collision, and the appellant collided into the respondent's car.

(R. 348, 343, 284).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING
TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
At the time of the accident in question in March, 1974, Section 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided:
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right
of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate
hazard, during the time when such driver is moving
within the intersection.
As set forth in §41-6-73, U.C.A., the driver of a vehicle executing
a left turn must yield the right of way whenever an oncoming vehicle
is "within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute
an immediate hazard, . . • "

In mandating that the left turning

driver yield the right-of-way, the statute places primary responsibility upon the left turning driver to assess the conditions
and potential hazards of the intended left turn, and requires that
the left turn be attempted only when it is safe to do so.

Further,

the statute expressly states that if any approaching vehicle is so
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.as
Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute
Museum and Library Services
close to Sponsored
the intersection
to
constitute
an ofimmediate
hazard,
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the left turning driver must yield the right-of-way to s uc h oncorncoming vehicle until it is safe to complete the turn.
The rationale for such a rule is set forth in French v. Ut~
Oil Refining co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002

(1950), at page lOoi

[The] burden is placed on the driver making the
turn as he has control of the situation, and if
there is a reasonable probability that the movement cannot be made in safety then the disfavored driver should yield. The driver proceeding
straight ahead has little opportunity to know a
vehicle is to be turned across his path until
the movement is commenced and in many instances,
the warning is too late for the latter driver to
take effective action.
Left turns, as with other vehicular movements against the traffic
flow, carry with them severe potential hazards.

A left turning

motorist usually must greatly reduce his speed, often coming to a
complete stop in his own lane of traffic.

He always changes his

direction of travel, but most dangerously of all, he must cross
over the lanes of traffic flowing in the opposite direction, risk·
ing collision with approaching vehicles.

Since it is the left

turning motorist who creates the potentially hazardous situation,
and since i t is the left turner that controls the decision of
whether the turn and when to turn, and thus upon his decision exposes himself and oncoming vehicles to the possibilities of a col·
lision, it is proper that the burden and responsibility of assess·
ing the potential dangers involved fall upon him.
Such a rule is sound.

It finds its roots in the common law

and is based upon common sense and practical experience.

(For a

case holding that a left turning motorist is required by conunon
law to yield the right-of-way to an oncoming motorist, see Blay~:
v. Westlund, 197 Or. 536, 254 P.2d 203
lowed such a rule by statute,

(1953))

Utah has long fol·

(See §57-7-137, U.C.A., 1953, for
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predecessor to present statute), and most states have adopted statutes identical or\ 2ry similar to Utah's statute.
Oregon: §115-337 O.C.L.A.; California: Vehicle Code

See, e.g.,
§551~

Colorado:

§209, Chapter 16, C.S.A. 1935.
The legislative history of the Utah statute controlling left
turns reflects the continuing and increasing concern of the legislature with regard to the dangers inherently associated with left
turn maneuvers.

Section 57-7-137, U.C.A.

(1943), read as follows:

The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the rightof-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction which is within the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver, having so yielded and having
given a signal when and as required by this act,
may make such left turn and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection fro~
said opposite direction shall yeild the right-ofway to the vehicle making the left turn.
The above language was carried over word for word into the 1953
code under §46-1-73.

In 1961, however, the legislature deleted the

following language from that section:
.but said driver, having so yielded and having
given a signal when and as required by this act,
may make such left turn and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection from
said opposite direction shall yield the right-ofway to the vehicle making the left turn.
In deleting this last phrase of §41-6-73, the Legislature clearly
increased the burden placed on the left turning motorist. Prior
to the deletion, once the left turner had activated his signal
and came to a complete stop, he had the affirmative right to complete his turn once all vehicles had passed which were dangerously close to the intersection when he first entered the intersection.

All approaching vehicles which had not been close to the

intersection had the affirmative duty to yield the right-of-way.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The 1961 amendment to §41-6-73 also added the following underlined language:
. . . so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, during the time when such driver is
moving within the intersection.
Under this language the left turning vehicle has the express

du~

to yield the right-of-way to any approaching vehicles that would
not only be so close as to constitute a hazard at the conunencement
of the left turn, but also to any vehicles that would be so cloH
as to constitute an immediate hazard any time.
Justice Crockett, in writing the opinion for the Court in
Smith v. Gallegos, 117 Utah 406, 400 P.2d 520 (1965), noted the
increased burden imposed on the left turning motorist by the 1961
amendment to §41-6-73, U.C.A.

He states:

The addition of the langauge just quoted clearly
places a greater duty on the left turner in that
he must yield not only to approaching vehicles
close enough to constitute a hazard prior to beginning his turn, but also to vehicles which will
constitute a hazard "during the time he is moving
within the intersection," which includes the time
i t will be necessary for him to complete his turn.
~' supra, at 571.
The 1961 amendment is clearly predicated upon the fact that
in most, if not all situations, the left turning motorist not only
has greater control over the situation but is also the one who
creates any potential hazard.

In light of this, the Legislature

has determined that the policy of promoting safety on the highways
is best served by placing a very heavy burden of responsibility
upon the driver wishing to execute a left turn.
While it is clear that the law places the primary responsibil·
ity upon the left turning motorist, it does not require the left
turning driver to be an absolute insurer of all accidents involv~
leftSponsored
turning
vehicles. To interpret the statute in such a manner
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-

as to find the left turning motorist negligent as a matter of law
in every accident involving a left turning vehicle would be illogical, unrealistic, inconsistent with corrunon experience, and would
not serve to promote safety.
such a rule.

This Court has consistently rejected

In Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291

(1954), Justice Crockett writing for the Court said:
It is recongized that right of way, based on direction of travel, is the best and most easily applied rule as to driver preference at intersections.
But in the very nature of things, i t cannot be absolute.
If it were, in any situation where there
was considerable traffic, it would be a practical
impossibility to safely make a left turn, no matter how long one waited, nor with what care he proceeded; the driver proceeding directly through
would have complete license to commit any kind of
negligence and claim the right of way under all circumstances, regardless of speed, lookout, distance
away when he observed the left turner, and notwithstanding his own lack of care, always lay the responsibility upon the person making the left turn.
It is so plain as to hardly warrant expression that
one cannot, consistent with reason and justice, determine beforehand that in every case involving
such an intersection collision, the driver making the
left turn is solely responsible for the mishap.
Walker, supra, at 293.
(emphasis added)
The appellant does not question the above reasoning, and does
not take the position that §41-6-73, U.C.A., requires that a left
turning motorist be found negligent as a matter of law in every
accident involving a left turning vehicle.

There are many conceiv-

able situations when a left turning motorist should not be liable
as a matter of law even though a collision occurred while making
a left turn.

Walker v. Petersen, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291 (1954)

presents such a case.
excessively.

In Walker, the oncoming motorist was speeding

The left turning motorist was clearly visible to

the oncoming mo tori.:; t for a great distance.

To find the left turn-

ing motorist negligent as a matter of law in such a case, simply
h2cause there occurred a collision involving a left turning vehiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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=
cle, would be tantamount to proclaming left turning drivers fair
game for any motorist who could possibly hit him.

Recognizing this.

the Court said:
Under the circumstances here, where the defendant
was in the intersection substantially ahead of
plaintiff in time, and was making the left turn
when the plaintiff was far enough away that ordinary reasonable care would require that he not insist upon claiming the right of way, plaintiff
cannot race on into the intersection and rely on
it to exculpate himself from wrong.
Walker, supra, at 293.
Similarly, the case of Smith v. Gallegos, 117 Utah 406, 400 P.2d

520 (1965), also involved an oncoming motorist who approached the
intersection at an excessive rate of speed.

In fact the evidence

showed that not only was the oncoming truck speeding as it approach·
ed the intersection, it continued accelerating as it entered the
intersection.

Smith, supra, at 572.

In such a case, as in

Walker, supra, even though an accident occurred involving a left
turning motorist, it clearly would be erroneous to find the left
turning motorist negligent as a matter of law by reason of §41-6-

73, U.C.A.
It is clear from the Smith and Walker cases that not all acci·
dents involving left turning vehicles should result in finding the
left turning motorist negligent as a matter of law.

It is equally

clear that there are cases where the left turning motorist is
negligent as a matter of law by reason of §41-6-73.

The narrow

fact situation presented by the instant case is clearly such a
case.
In the present case, the appellant was so close to the inter·
section while the respondent executed her left turn as to consti·
tute an immediate hazard within the meaning of §41-6-73, u.c.A.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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respondent
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Library
Services
and Technology Act, administered
the Utah State Library. as a matter of law in
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failing to yield the right-of-way.

According to testimony elicit-

ed from the investigating officer by the respondent's counsel, the
respondent's vehicle travelled some 43 feet from the commencement
of the left turn to the point of impact.

(R. 232}

Testimony was

also elicited establishing the respondent's average speed to be
between 5 and 8 m.p.h. during her left turn.

(R. 230, 367)

Based

upon these figures, i t was determined that at 8 m.p.h., 3.6 seconds
would elapse from the time the left turn was commenced to the
moment of collision.

(R.

3 82}

If the respondent's average speed

was 5 rn.p.h., the elapsed time would have been 5.8 seconds.
382)

{R.

It was further established that the appellant's motorcycle

left 50 feet of skidmarks and that 1.9 seconds of actual braking
time was required to leave those skid marks,

(R. 234) and, ·in

addition, that i t would take approximately 1.5 seconds of reaction time for the appellant to actually succeed in applying his
brakes.

(R. 222, 253)

Adding the actual braking elapsed time

(1.9 seconds) to the reaction elapsed time {1.5 seconds), we
get 3.4 seconds as the minimum amount of time required for appellant to slow his motorcycle to a speed of 5 m.p.h. at the point
of impact.

If we assume that the respondent executed her turn at

8 m.p.h., thus requiring 3.7 seconds to arrive at the point of
impact, since 3.4 seconds were required for the appellant to brake
to a collision speed of 5 m.p.h. at the point of impact, it is
obvious that from the moment the respondent commenced her turn,
the appellant was so close to the intersection that the collision
was unavoidable.

Even if the appellant had been able to see the

respondent commence her turn, and immediately responded by slamming on his brakes, the collision still would have occurred.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In

such a situation the appellant would, without question, be so
close to the intersection at the commencement of the turn as to
constitute an "immediate hazard".
Now if we assume that the respondent's average turning speed
was 5 m.p.h., the difference between the minimum time required
for the appellant to slow to a

5 m.p.h. at the point of impact

and the time necessary to complete the 43 foot turn to the point
of impact is still only 2.5 seconds (5.9-3.4=2.5).

If we assume

again that the appellant is able to immediately percieve a danger
situation and react to it immediately, even if he were able to
observe the respondent the instant she commenced her turn, it
would still be necessary to severely reduce his speed.

This nec-

essary reduction of speed would not be the result of the appellant
speeding as in Walker, supra, or Smith, supra.

It was clearly

established that the appellant was going 30 m.p.h. which is 5
m.p.h. less than the posted speed limit.

The reduction in speed

would be caused by the respondent turning left in front of the
appellant when he was so close that he would be required to irnrnedi·
ately and drastically reduce his speed to avoid a collision.

Such

a reduction in speed would properly be termed an evasive action
to avoid a collision.
The above computations clearly show that regardless of
whether the respondent's average turning speed was 5 m.p.h. or
8 m.p.h. or something in between (which is most likely), the
appellant was so close to the intersection at the time when the
respondent commenced her left turn that he had been able to see
the respondent when she commenced her left turn, the accident
either could not have been avoided at all, or would have been
avoided only by the narrowest of margins and only by the appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lant taking immediate action to avoid a collision.

The appel-

lant submits that he was, therefore, "so close to the turning
vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard" as contemplated by
§41-6-73, and that the respondent was, therefore, required by law
to yield the right-of-way to him.

In failing to do so, she was

negligent as a matter of law.
POINT II
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT IN THAT SHE ATTEMPTED TO EXECUTE A LEFT
TURN WITHOUT ASCERTAINING WHETHER IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO.

THE

TRIAL COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
The respondent claims that she did not see the

appe~lant

approaching and, therefore, did not realize that he was so dangerously close.

Such a response does not excuse her from complying

with the provisions of §41-6-73.

Such a response is merely an

admission of her further negligence in failing to keep a proper
lookout.

It was not impossible for the respondent to see the ap-

pellant approaching, she simply failed to make the necessary effort to showly move to a position that would have allowed her to
observe any approaching vehicles.
In the present case, the respondent's view of oncoming traffic was at least partially blocked by the oncoming truck/camper
that was about to turn left in front of the respondent.

(R. 343)

The respondent states that she looked to see if any cars were
coming, and seeing none, she made her left turn.

(R. 342}

But

when one's vision is blocked as the respondent's admittedly was,
it is not enough to merely look in the general direction of the
C11Jproaching
traffic and then commence turning. The proper rule
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.....,
in such a case is that upon entering an intersection, if one's
vision is blocked, one has the duty to cautiously move to a position where he can effeciently observe traffic, stop again and
make an effective observation, and then proceed only when it is
safe to do so.

In ~v. Transport Indem Co., 23 Wis. 2d 182,

127 N.W.2d 251 (19641, i t was held that when one's vision is so
blocked upon entering an intersection, it is negligence as a ma~
ter of law to fail to follow such a procedure.
Had the respondent followed the above rule, she would have
had a clear view of the road ahead.

She could have observed the

appellant who was about to enter the intersection, and the accident would have been avoided.

Her failure to so act amounted to

negligence as a matter of law.
The above rule is sound.

It is not a great burden to require

a left turning motorist who, upon entering an intersection, finds
his vision blocked by an obstruction, to move to a position where
he can effectively observe all approaching traffic.

Such a pro-

cedure would require only an additional one or two seconds and
would effectively reduce the possibility of a collision between a
left turning vehicle and oncoming traffic.

The current popular-

ity of campers, vans and large motor homes make such a rule even
more important.

A truck with a camper, a large van, or a motor

home can easily obscure many types of vehicles, not only motorcycles, but also many smaller cars that are seen with such increas·
ing frequency on the highways.

To not require left turning motor·

ists whose vision is blocked by an obstruction to move to a point
where the vision is no longer obstructed before attempting to com·
plete a left turn, will only serve to invite an increasing number
of accidents involving smaller cars and motorcycles, which are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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easily hidden by larger vehicles.
CONCLUSION
Section 41-6-73, U.C.A., requires that left turning motorists
yield the right-of-way to approaching vehicles that are within the
intersection or so close to the intersection as to constitute an
immediate hazard.

The appellant was "so close to the intersection

as to constitute an irrunediate hazard" within the meaning of the
statute, and, therefore, the respondent was negligent as a matter
of law in failing to yield the right-of-way.

Further, the respon-

dent was negligent as a matter of law in that she attempted to
turn left while her view of oncoming traffic was blocked.

Had she

made a minimal effort to get a clear view of the oncoming traffic,
she would have observed the appellant who was about to eater the
intersection and the accident would have been avoided.

The appel-

lant, therefore, respectfully urges that this Court vacate the
verdict of the lower court and render judgment for the appellant
on the issue of liability and remand the case on the issue of
damages.
Respectfully submitted this //~h day of April, 1977.

::;;5:;5;:~ -

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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